Prof. Dr. Franziska Lauenstein is an Assistant Professor of Strategy at KLU. Before joining KLU, she was an Assistant Professor in the Strategic Organization Design Group at the University of Southern Denmark. She obtained her PhD at the University of Hamburg and had research stays at Bocconi University, Milan, and Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona.
Franziska Lauenstein’s research interests lie at the intersection of behavioral strategy and organization design & adaptation. She is interested in how organizations work and how we can make them work better. She particularly studies how organization design choices influence individual behavior and how this can help organizations adapt in changing environments. Franziska Lauenstein mainly approaches this, using behavioral experiments.
Franziska Lauenstein teaches a course in corporate strategy in the Bachelor‘s program and a course on business strategy and sustainability in the Master‘s program. To facilitate the student's learning experience, Franziska Lauenstein utilizes case-based learning methods and interactive course formats.
Selected Publications
(In press): How Mixed Performance Feedback Shapes Exploration: The Moderating Role of Self-Enhancement, Organization Science: 1-43.
Abstract: We conduct an experiment to examine how providing decision makers with high vs. low peer performance information influences choices between exploration and exploitation. Previous work on organization-level learning suggests a high-performing peer would fuel exploration, while a low-performing peer would dampen it. In line with this, we find that individuals who receive information about a high-performing peer explore more than those who receive information about a low-performing peer. However, we also find that, compared to individuals with a low tendency to self-enhance, individuals with a high tendency to self-enhance are less likely to explore when receiving information about a high-performing peer. In fact, these individuals explore at levels comparable to those who receive information about a low-performing peer. We explain this behavioral pattern by demonstrating that, as individuals learn and improves, information about a high-performing peer increasingly results in mixed performance feedback; under these conditions of relative interpretive flexibility, exploration is moderated by decision makers’ tendency to self-enhance. When these individual dynamics are aggregated, our data suggest that an organization that provides peer performance information may experience either the same or less exploration than an organization that does not, with the exact difference depending on its proportion of high self-enhancers. These insights into the contingencies and aggregate effects of how individuals interpret and respond to peer performance information are particularly relevant given recent interest in designing organizations that shape employee behavior through the provision of feedback, rather than through traditional instruments of coordination and control such as incentives or hierarchy.
(2022): The Upside of Sugarcoating: Inaccurate Performance Reporting and Exploration in Organizations, Academy of Management Proceedings, 2022 (1): .
Abstract: In this paper, we study how information asymmetries and specifically the opportunity to inaccurately report performance feedback in decentralized organizational structures influences exploration. In many organizations, exploration is characterized by a two-staged process, where a higher-level decision-maker selects a lower-level unit to engage in exploration efforts, and a lower-level unit reports back a performance outcome. Such decentralized structures are also prone to information asymmetries, which are generally seen as undesirable, and aimed to be reduced through monitoring. In this study, we provide experimental evidence that information asymmetries are not always undesirable for organizations and that monitoring can hinder exploration efforts in organizations. The key results from our two experimental studies are that, first, lower-level units that take advantage of information asymmetries and report performance outcomes inaccurately, explore more and experiment more with risky solutions. Second, at the higher level, monitoring, and the revelation of inaccurate reporting leads to the avoidance of particular units, less exploration and foregone gains of exploration in this domain. This is important as it enlarges our understanding on how decentralized structures can foster exploration – against the intuition – information asymmetries can be beneficial, and managers may rather accept them than trying to reduce them. These insights are particularly relevant considering recent interest in ‘flatter’ organizational structures with more decision-making authority to lower-level units and less control.
(2020): Categories and Exploration, Academy of Management Proceedings, 2020 (1): .
Abstract: Understanding how novel ideas are evaluated and recognized is important for organizational prosperity. A systematic evaluative bias against novel options after a negative experience - known as the ‘hot stove effect’ - may prevent organizations from engaging in enough explorations to identify novel ideas. We show that the adverse consequences of the hot-stove effect can be reduced by manipulating how novel options are categorized. The core of our mechanism is that categorization of options in more categories reduces the generalization of negative experience to other options, whereas categorization in fewer options favors such generalization. We develop predictions based on a computational model and test these in a behavioral experiment (N=302). The task environment is a setting in which participants decide between a known ‘status quo’ option and six unknown, novel options. Participants are randomly allocated into three conditions that vary in terms of the number of categories to which the novel options belong. If the six novel options belong to six distinct categories, the propensity to explore is significantly higher than when options belong to fewer categories. When all novel options belong to the same category, participant are most likely to avoid exploration. Our findings suggests new ways managers could favor, or prevent, exploration of novel options by organizational members."
Teaching at KLU
Academic Positions
| since 4/2024 | Assistant Professor in Strategy, Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany |
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| 2021-2024 | Assistant Professor in Strategy and Organization, University of Southern Denmark (Off tenure clock in 2023) |
| 2019-2021 | Postdoc, University of Southern Denmark, Supervisor: Oliver Baumann |
Visiting Positions
| 2022 | Visiting Scholar (Spring), Bocconi University, Italy. Host: Alfonso Gambardella |
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| 2019 | Visiting PhD (Spring), University Pompeu Fabra, Spain. Host: Gaël Le Mens |
| 2017 | Visiting PhD (Autumn), University of Southern Denmark. Host: Stephan Billinger |
Education
| 2019 | Ph.D. in Management, University of Hamburg, Germany Graduated with honors (summa cum laude), Supervisor: Alexander Bassen |
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| 2015 | M.Sc. in Strategy and Organization, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark |
| 2012 | B.A. in Business Administration, Hamburg School of Business Administration, Germany |
Research Interests
Behavioral Strategy, Adaptation & Innovation, Organizational Learning & Design
2022 - Academy of Management 2022, Best Paper Proceedings, OMT division for "The Upside of Sugarcoating" with Oliver Baumann and Thorsten Wahle
2016 - oikos Teaching Case Writing Competition, First prize, Finance Track
