Prof. Dr. Andreas K. Gernert

Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations

Prof. Dr. Andreas K. Gernert

Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations

Prof. Dr. Andreas Gernert is Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations at KLU. Before joining KLU, Andreas was a post-doctoral researcher in the Technology and Operations Management Area at INSEAD. He obtained his PhD at the EBS University in the Institute for Supply Chain Management and his Master of Science in Mathematics at Ulm University.

Prof. Dr. Gernert's current research examines policies, business models, and strategies pertaining to the three dimensions of sustainability - environmental, social, and economic. In this realm, he utilizes Game Theory, Optimization, and Statistics (i) to characterize policies that enhance efficiency and fairness in processes that support people in need, (ii) to identify profitable and impactful business models for entrepreneurs in developing countries' emergency management systems, (iii) to study different strategies to mitigate financial distress in supply chains, and (iv) to examine interventions that are supposed to reduce child labor in the agricultural sector. His research has been published in the Decision Sciences and Production and Operations Management. 

Prof. Dr. Gernert teaches Operations Management and Sustainable Supply Chain Management. To facilitate the students' learning experience, Prof. Dr. Gernert utilizes interactive and student-centered teaching methods such as case study discussions and educational games.  

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Selected Publications

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478231224973 

Abstract: Several low- and middle-income countries’ emergency transportation systems (ETSs) do not have a centralized emergency number. Instead, they have many independent ambulance providers, each with a small number of ambulances. As a result, ETSs in these contexts lack coordination and ambulances. Using a free-entry equilibrium model, we show that in such decentralized systems, the probability that any given call can be served by at least one ambulance, that is, its coverage, is at most 71.54%, regardless of the ETS’s profitability. We examine three business models that can address the ETS’s lack of coordination and ambulances: (i) a competitor-only business model, where an entrepreneur enters the ETS and acquires ambulances to compete with existing providers; (ii) a platform business model, where an entrepreneur coordinates existing providers; and (iii) an innovative platform-plus business model, where an entrepreneur combines (i) and (ii): setting-up a platform and acquiring platform-owned ambulances. We also examine a government-run platform that takes no commissions from providers. Using a game-theoretic approach, we find that it is optimal for all platform models to incentivize all providers to join. However, only the government-run platform may incentivize providers to acquire additional ambulances. Furthermore, a government-run platform offers higher coverage than a platform-plus only when the platform’s power to coordinate ambulance providers is moderate. Our results can help entrepreneurs and policymakers in LMICs navigate various tradeoffs in improving their countries’ ETS.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108584 

Abstract: In the pharmaceutical industry, personalized medicine is increasingly replacing the traditional blockbuster drug concept. Personalized medicine consists of a targeted drug that is only prescribed if a companion diagnostic test detects the corresponding biomarker. This concept promises improved treatments of various diseases. However, personalized medicine also presents pharmaceutical firms with new challenges resulting from interdependencies in the drug and diagnostic test development processes. Although pharmaceutical firms generally benefit from competition among diagnostic firms, the threat of substitutes from competitors could cause diagnostic firms to step back from new product development in the first place, leading to lost revenues for the pharmaceutical firm. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that may inform two competing differentiated diagnostic firms about a drug under development, such that these firms can develop a corresponding diagnostic test. We show which diagnostic firm the pharmaceutical firm should inform first and how granting early exclusivity to a single diagnostic firm can maximize pharmaceutical profits from personalized medicine.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/10591478241248751 

Abstract: Diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) are at the core of present-day health and humanitarian logistics. Aid organizations advocate inclusive people-centered approaches to ensure that affected communities receive appropriate aid in an effective and equitable way. Tensions and even conflicts can arise if affected communities perceive the distribution of aid as inequitable. These perceptions are driven by people’s so-called distributional preferences. These preferences are shaped by culture, social bonds, and experiences, and they describe how an individual’s well-being and behavior are impacted by potential inequalities. Their importance is increasingly recognized by aid organizations, but research on equity in health and humanitarian logistics remains focused on equal access and prioritizing needs. Using current examples from the Syrian and Rohingya refugee crises, we show the importance of recognizing and managing distributional preferences. Based on these examples and in line with DEI principles, we discuss several ways that we, as the operations community, can help conceptualize inclusive and people-centered approaches that account for distributional preferences.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13986 

Abstract: To maintain future supplier competition, manufacturers may support financially distressed suppliers by sourcing from them, even if they are less efficient than competitors, and by procuring larger quantities from them at higher prices. We analyze these strategies in a model in which a manufacturer decides for one of two available suppliers, supplier bankruptcy risk is endogenous, and financial distress can lead to internal or external reorganization. Following bankruptcy, the remaining supplier may serve as a backup option. Our research identifies settings in which the manufacturer should support the distressed supplier. We also find that in some cases, a nondistressed supplier may charge price premiums due to its competitor's distress, while in other cases, it may use predatory pricing to drive its competitor into bankruptcy. We complement our results with a small case study and show how our model can explain patterns observed in industry.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/deci.12484 

Abstract: Should a firm, which seeks to subcontract a new product development project, leverage competition among potential suppliers and ask all of them to engage in research and development in parallel? Or should it first invite offers and commit to the supplier with the best offer, before only this supplier engages in development? Building on analytical literature on both formats, we apply game theory to answer these questions. We identify Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies and characterize advantages of both formats. We find that having multiple suppliers engage in new product development in parallel is favored only if enough suppliers can be attracted, which is the case when development uncertainty and learning benefits are high. The participation decision also depends on the specific structure of the project's development costs. If administrative overhead and material costs are substantial, while engaging in development and exerting effort is relatively cheap but does not offer many learning opportunities, the number of suppliers who would be willing to engage in parallel development is limited. First inviting offers and selecting the best supplier to exclusively engage in new product development then becomes more attractive for the buyer. We discuss further implications and characterize environments that may foster more innovativeness in this context.

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Academic Positions

Since 1/2022

Assistant Professor for Sustainable Operations, Kühne Logistics University, Hamburg, Germany
2020 - 2021

Post-doctoral Researcher, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

2015 - 2019

Research Assistant, EBS University, Wiesbaden, Germany

Education

2016 -  2019

Doctorate, EBS University, Wiesbaden, Germany

2011 - 2013

Master of Science in Mathematics, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany

2007 - 2011 Bachelor of Science in Mathematics, University of Ulm, Ulm, Germany

Professional Experience

2016 Procurement Management, Airbus, Hamburg, Germany

2014  - 2015

Game Designer and Monetization Specialist, Gameforge AG, Hamburg, Germany
  • Van den Berg, P., Calmon, A.P., Gernert, A.K., Lemmens, S., Romero, G. (2023), Operational Challenges for EMS Platforms in Developing Economies, POMS 2023, Florida, USA, 21-25 May 2023
  • Gernert, A. K., Calmon, A. P., Romero, G., Van Wassenhove, . N. (2022), Business model innovation for ambulance systems in developing Countries: Coordination and Competition, MSOM 2022, Munich, Germany, 26-28 June 2022
  • Gernert, A. K., Calmon, A. P., Romero, G., Wuttke, D. A. (2021): Coordinate or Compete in a Market with Fragmented Supply. INFORMS Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA
  • Gernert, A. K., Calmon, A. P., Iancu, D. A., Wuttke, D. A. (2021): Addressing Child Labor and Deforestation in the Cocoa Sector. INFORMs Annual Meeting, Anaheim, CA, USA
  • Wuttke, D. A., Gernert, A. K., Heese, H. S. (2019): Sourcing Decisions with a Financially Distressed Supplier. POMS Conference, Washington, DC, USA
  • Gernert, A. K. (2018): The Effects of Taxes on Education, Labor, and Rent-Seeking. Annual Session of the IOEA, Cargèse, France
  • Gernert, A. K., Heese, H. S., Wuttke, D. A. (2017): Outsourcing New Product Development Projects: Development before Commitment or Commitment before Development? INFORMS Annual Meeting, Houston, TX, USA