Daan van Beek: Mechanism Design for Group Purchasing in Emerging Economies

Mechanism design for group purchasing organizations (GPOs) is typically studied in stable markets, where transfer fees are used to align incentives. In emerging markets, however, GPOs often face limited information and vulnerable supply conditions. We study this environment using a two-player principal–agent model in which agents have suppliers with observable prices but unobservable reliability. Coordination is incentivized through an ex-ante transfer fee. This mechanism proves ineffective under a single-sourcing mechanism for achieving coordination. Under a double-sourcing strategy, coordination can be achieved. However, the role of the transfer fee under double-sourcing is multifaceted, as it may generate tensions between system optimality and agents’ perceived optimality.
 

Daan van Beek started his PhD at Kühne Logistics University in April 2022 under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Maria Besiou Prof. Dr. Niels Van Quaquebeke. His research focuses on combining human behaviour with quantitative modelling efforts in the context of the humanitarian aid sector.
Prior to joining KLU he worked as a research assistant at TU Delft. His interest for the humanitarian sector was triggered while working on his master thesis, in which he explored the potential risks of human behaviour vis-à-vis a novel food distribution system.
Whilst obtaining his BSc in Civil Engineering and a MSc in Engineering and Policy Analysis at Delft University of Technology, Daan spent significant time abroad. During his BSc, Daan studied for two semesters at École Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées in Paris, France and his bachelor thesis in Nakuru, Kenya. For a specialization in high-performance computing as partial fulfillment of his MSc, he spent one semester at Politecnico di Milano, Italy.